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Active Differential Privacy Budget Management 
Background 
 Datasets and data derived therefrom may include and/or reveal information regarding one 
or more individuals whose records are contained in the dataset.  For example, a dataset from a 
medical study may include an age of an individual who participated in the medical study.  
Oftentimes, such data and/or the release thereof is the subject of privacy concerns.  For example, 
data from a dataset may be combined with other data (e.g., publically available data, etc.) to 
reveal the identity of individuals whose records are contained in the dataset.  This is generally 
undesirable.  Therefore, removing personally identifiable information (PII) such as names, Social 
Security numbers, and the like from a dataset is often not enough to ensure that the dataset does 
not reveal information regarding individuals whose records are contained in the dataset and/or 
preventing data from the dataset from being linked back to such individuals.  For example, in the 
1990’s it was shown that “anonymized” records (e.g., records with direct identifiers such as 
names, etc. removed) summarizing information about hospital visits could be directly linked to 
their subject by cross-correlating the anonymized records with voter registration data.  This is 
generally referred to as privacy leakage.  It is worth noting that privacy leakage can still occur 
where primary data (e.g., an element directly contained in a dataset, etc.) is not released.  In 
many scenarios, the release of results produced by analyzing a dataset (e.g., statistical measures 
such as mean, median, standard deviation, etc.) may similarly cause privacy leakage.  Indeed, an 
individual need not be included in a dataset for the release of results produced by analyzing the 
dataset to cause privacy leakage of information regarding the individual.  For example, an 
insurance provider may learn of a study on heart disease indicating that, of those sampled, 
individuals with brown hair had a significant increase in heart attacks, and may know that client 
Fred has brown hair (and therefore an increased risk of heart attack based on the study), and may 
increase Fred’s insurance premium as a result. 
 To solve this challenge and facilitate the release of data without violating individuals’ 
privacy, systems and methods of differential privacy were developed.  Differential privacy 
facilitates the quantification of privacy leakage and provides formal privacy guarantees regarding 
the release of data such as datasets.  However, often differential privacy guarantees (e.g., 
quantifying an amount of privacy leakage associated with a release of data, etc.) must be 
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developed on a case-by-case basis.  For example, the amount of privacy leakage associated with 
a release of information may depend on the type of analysis used to generate the information 
being released.  Moreover, each release of information may incur additional privacy leakage.  
For example, if many different information releases occur, the total privacy leakage may grow 
even though the privacy leakage of each individual release is limited.  Policy makers often want 
to limit the total privacy leakage, which requires composing the individual privacy leakage of 
each release.  Therefore, it is often necessary to review these factors manually to develop an 
accurate model of privacy leakage and/or determine countermeasures to ensure adequate privacy 
(e.g., adding random noise to the information released, etc.).   
However, in many scenarios it may be unrealistic to manually review every release of 
information (e.g., manually compose the privacy leakage from every release of information, etc.) 
to ensure differential privacy.  For example, in the online-retail environment, retailers may 
request daily summaries from advertisement-serving platforms regarding the effectiveness of 
their ad-campaigns.  For an ad-serving platform having thousands or hundreds of thousands of 
customers, manually reviewing each request to determine if it would exceed the desired total 
privacy leakage may be infeasible.  Therefore, there is 
a need for systems and methods that facilitate 
programmatic access (e.g., those that limit an amount 
of manual review required, etc.) to datasets and/or data 
derived therefrom (e.g., statistical measures, etc.).  
Described herein is a platform for providing access to 
datasets and/or data derived therefrom while 
maintaining differential privacy (e.g., quantifying 
privacy leakage and/or limiting total privacy leakage, 
etc.).  Moreover, a number of usability features to 
improve the ease of user interaction with the platform 
are discussed. 
Overview 
Referring now to FIG. 1, a method of 
processing a user query for data is shown.  εB may 
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refer to a privacy budget.  In various embodiments, εB is specific to one or more factors.  For 
example, εB may be a privacy budget for a specific customer for a specific data-day.  Data-days 
are discussed in greater detail below.  εB may be a static variable (e.g., every customer has the 
same privacy budget, etc.) or may be a dynamic factor (e.g., some customers are given different 
privacy budgets, etc.).  In various embodiments, εB is a real number.  For example, εB may be 
equal to 1.78.  M may be a model limit.  For example, M may be a limit of a model per customer 
per data-day.  In some embodiments, M is equal to 100.  However, other values are possible.  ε0 
may be an overall query privacy budget.  In various embodiments, ε0 = εB/M.  L may be a user-
specified input-filtering 2-norm limit.  In various embodiments, the method includes one or more 
pre-calculation operations.  εN is a noise privacy budget.  In various embodiments, εN is equal to 
ln(1+(eε0-1)/p)=fN(p, ε0), where p is a user-specified sampling ratio (e.g., to discard rows, etc.). 
Referring generally to FIG. 1, the method may include receiving a query such as a query 
for statistical measures (e.g., mean, median, standard deviation, variance, etc.) associated with a 
dataset such as a dataset describing user engagement with online content (e.g., online ads, etc.).  
For example, a database may include records describing a number of online interactions with 
content items and identifiers (e.g., device identifiers, etc.) associated with the number of online 
interactions and an individual may query the database to retrieve information associated with the 
number of online interactions (e.g., aggregate volume of interactions, interactions by device type, 
etc.).  In various embodiments, the query is received from an external computing system such as 
a computing system associated with a retailer. 
In various embodiments, the method includes calculating an overall query privacy budget 
ε0.  In various embodiments, ε0 is equal to εB/M.  In some embodiments, the method includes one 
or more usability features, discussed in detail below, which may affect the value of ε0.  In various 
embodiments, the method includes determining L.  In various embodiments, row contribution 
filtering facilitates preventing users from skewing outputs.  For example, row contribution 
filtering may prevent users from injecting a single row having a large value for inputs, thereby 
skewing the outputs.  In some embodiments, L is determined based on a default limit (e.g., an 
upper and/or lower bound, etc.).  For example, the default limit may vary dynamically based on 
various factors (e.g., by customer, by user, by query type, etc.).  Additionally or alternatively, L 
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may be determined based on a hard limit (e.g., an upper and/or lower bound, etc.).  In various 
embodiments, row contribution filtering requires users to pre-commit to a maximum row size. 
In various embodiments, the method includes comparing a privacy budget associated 
with the query to an allowed (e.g., remaining, etc.) privacy budget associated with the 
user/customer.  For example, a particular query may relate to information spanning a number of 
data-days and comparing the privacy budget associated with the query to the allowed privacy 
budget may include checking the privacy budget for each data-day in the query with the 
remaining privacy budget for each data-day (e.g., using budget database, etc.).  If there is 
sufficient remaining privacy budget to enable the query, the method may proceed to analyze the 
dataset based on the query.  Alternatively, if there is insufficient remaining privacy budget to 
enable the query (e.g., the query is over budget, etc.), the method may include transmitting an 
error (e.g., describing that the query is over budget, etc.).  In some embodiments, transmitting the 
error includes spending an amount of privacy budget (e.g., due to the release of information 
associated with the error, etc.). 
In various embodiments, the method includes performing one or more pre-calculations 
(as described above).  For example, the method may include determining a user count associated 
with the query to determine whether the query relates to a sufficient number of users (e.g., isn’t 
producing granular data on a single user/device, etc.).  For example, the method may include 
determining the user count associated with the query and comparing the determined user count to 
a threshold.  If the query relates to an insufficient number of users (e.g., too few users, the 
determined user count is less than the threshold, etc.) the method may include transmitting an 
error.  In some embodiments, transmitting the error includes spending an amount of privacy 
budget (e.g., due to the release of information associated with the error, etc.).  If the query relates 
to a sufficient number of users, the method may proceed to generate a model associated with the 
query.  For example, the method may include generating a linear regression model of the form 
y=mx+b describing conversion information associated with a number of online interactions.  In 
various embodiments, the method includes transmitting results associated with the model and/or 
the query such as a slope and/or a y-intercept associated with the model (e.g., m and/or b in the 
example above, etc.).  In various embodiments, the results are transmitted to an entity that 
submitted the query.  In various embodiments, the method includes spending a privacy budget 
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associated with the query.  For example, the method may include updating a budget database to 
reflect the privacy budget used for each data-day associated with the query and/or transmitted 
results. 
In various embodiments, the method described above may be implemented using one or 
more computing systems.  For example, the method may be implemented using a distributed 
processing system having one or more processing circuits, each including one or more processors 
and one or more memories, the memories having instructions stored thereon that, when executed 
by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processing circuits to perform the various 
operations described herein. 
Discussion of Factors Affecting Privacy Budgets and/or Usability 
Before turning to various possible augmentations of the method/system described above, 
various factors affecting privacy budgets and/or usability are discussed. 
Budgets 
In various embodiments, customers may share a privacy budget.  For example, a number 
of customers that routinely request information derived from a data source may all share a 
privacy budget.  Additionally or alternatively, customers may receive their own budget.  In 
various embodiments, information is organized into datasets.  For example, device interaction 
data may be organized into a dataset according to a source of the data.  In various embodiments, 
each dataset receives its own budget. 
Over Budget: What Happens? 
In various embodiments, the method described above may transmit an error in response 
to determining that a query violates (e.g., exceeds, etc.) an amount of allotted/remaining privacy 
budget.  In some embodiments, transmitting the error includes transmitting an error without 
supplemental information (e.g., information describing a cause of the error, etc.).  In some 
embodiments, transmitting the error includes transmitting an error with supplemental 
information.  For example, the error may include information describing which day(s) exceeded 
the privacy budget and/or that a specific user has exceeded their allotted budget (e.g., a customer 
has remaining budget but an individual associated with the customer that is making the query has 
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exhausted their portion of the customer budget, etc.).  Additionally or alternatively, the method 
may include removing data-days that have exhausted budgets from the query and re-running the 
query.  For example, the method may include identifying one or more data-days included in the 
original query that have exhausted budgets and generating an augmented query based on the 
original query by removing the one or more data-days from the original query.  In various 
embodiments, each error-handling method is associated with an amount of privacy budget spend.  
For example, a first error including a large amount of supplemental information may be 
associated with a larger expenditure of privacy budget than a second error including no 
supplemental information. 
Determining a User Count 
As described above, the method may include one or more pre-calculations such as 
determining a user count.  In various embodiments, determining the user count includes 
determining a noisy user count (e.g., a count of user associated with a query with random noise 
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added to the count, etc.).  In some embodiments, the user count is calculated using partition 
selection as described in “Differentially private partition selection” (Desfonaines et al., 2020).  
Usability Features 
Referring now to FIG. 2, another method 
of processing a user query for data is shown.  In 
various embodiments, the method of FIG. 2 is 
similar to the method of FIG. 1 with added 
usability features.  In various embodiments, r is a 
user-specified privacy ratio per query.  For 
example, r may allow users to generate queries 
having more noise, thereby conserving a greater 
amount of privacy budget per query.  In some 
embodiments, r is equal to 1/M.  In various 
embodiments, the privacy budget εB may 
comprise a normal portion and a reserve portion.  
For example, εB may include a reserve portion 
that may be activated by a system administrator 
(e.g., of a system implementing the method of 
FIG. 2, etc.).  In various embodiments, the reserve 
portion may be used in emergency situations 
where the normal budget is inadvertently 
consumed (e.g., through an incorrectly 
parameterized query, via an inexperienced user, etc.).  In some embodiments, a whitelist 
including users that may access the reserve portion may be maintained to determine access to the 
reserve portion.  In various embodiments, calculating r*εB improves usability of the 
method/system for users.  For example, a user may select a value of r, thereby enabling a larger 
number of higher-noise queries than otherwise possible.  In some embodiments, user selection of 
r is only available to a select number of users specified by a whitelist.  In various embodiments, 
these features may facilitate preventing a single individual (e.g., an inexperienced junior data 
scientist, etc.) from inadvertently spending an entire customer’s privacy budget allocation on a 
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single query (e.g., an incorrectly parameterized query, an overbroad query, etc.).  In some 
embodiments, the number of queries per user and/or per customer are limited (e.g., user can only 
make 5 queries a day, etc.). 
In various embodiments, the method facilitates sandbox models.  For example, the 
method may enable users to test out query parameters on a fake dataset (e.g., a generated dataset 
that does not include real online interaction data, etc.).  In this way, users may determine query 
parameters through trial-and-error without spending on privacy budgets. 
In various embodiments, the method of FIG. 2 may be implemented using one or more 
computing systems.  For example, the method may be implemented using a distributed 
processing system having one or more processing circuits, each including one or more processors 
and one or more memories, the memories having instructions stored thereon that, when executed 
by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processing circuits to perform the various 
operations described herein. 
In various embodiments, the methods/systems described here may facilitate the 
methodical release of information in a differentially private manner by tracking access 
characteristics associated with datasets (e.g., which datasets were accessed and what information 
was accessed from those datasets, etc.). 
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A data processing system may facilitate the methodical release of information in a 
differentially private manner by tracking access characteristics associated with datasets.  The 
data processing system may maintain a privacy budget allocation for entities and/or users and 
may calculate privacy budget expenditures based on queries submitted by the entities and/or 
users.  The data processing system may process entity and/or user queries for information from 
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